Adults' learning of complex explanations violates their intuitions about optimal explanatory order.

Should you first teach about the purpose of a microwave or about how it heats food? Adults strongly prefer explanations to present function before mechanism and information about a whole to precede information about its component parts. Here we replicate those preferences (Study 1). Using the same stimuli, we then ask whether those pedagogical preferences reflect ease of learning of labels, function, or mechanism. Surprisingly, explanations that accord with function-before-mechanism and whole-before-part structure show no learning benefits to participants compared to other participants who see lessons that violate one or both intuitions (Study 2). Even when potential scaffolds are removed (i.e., diagrams) the preferred pedagogical order does not predict better learning (Study 3). Finally, explanatory order has only modest effects on experiential outcomes (e.g., curiosity, frustration; Study 4). In all cases, all orders of presentation support learning in comparison to controls and are not constrained by either ceiling or floor effects. Reasons for the clash between intuitions about learning and actual outcomes are explored.

Same people, different group: Social structures are a central component of group concepts.

We examine whether people conceptualize organized groups as having at least two parts: In addition to members (e.g., Alice), they also have social structures (i.e., roles and relations). If groups have members and social structures, then numerically distinct groups can have the same members if they differ in their structures. In Studies 1-4, participants numerically distinguished groups that had the same members when they had different structures. Participants numerically distinguished even when groups had the same function-the same people playing chess together Monday and Tuesday can be numerically distinct groups. In Study 4, we compare clubs to tables, and find that participants numerically distinguish tables by their structures too (i.e., the configuration of their parts) even when they have the same parts (which can be disassembled and then reassembled with ease). In Study 5, we find that participants rate groups as existing in space and time like concrete objects, suggesting that participants represent groups as at least partially concrete, such that groups have at least two parts (their structures and their members). Finally, in Study 6, we show that people will judge the same person as exemplary with respect to one group but condemnable with respect to another-even when those groups have the same members.

A right way to explain? Function, mechanism, and the order of explanations.

People generally prefer functional explanations over mechanistic ones. This preference might arise from attributing greater value to functional information. However, instead of an overall preference for functional explanations, people might simply expect functional information to precede mechanistic information. Here, we ask whether people have such preferences for the order of functional and mechanistic information in explanations and how those preferences might arise. In a first set of studies, we show that adults do in fact prefer functional information to precede mechanistic. In a second set of studies, we show that people have a more general preference for explanations to address the whole before parts. Finally, we show that the preference for function to precede mechanism may be related to the broader whole-before-parts preference.

Subjectivity and social constitution: Contrasting conceptions of institutions, artifacts, and animals.

We systematically compared beliefs about animal (e.g., lion), artifactual (e.g., hammer), and institutional (e.g., police officer) categories, aiming to identify whether people draw different inferences about which categories are subjective and which are socially constituted. We conducted two studies with 270 American children, ages 4 through 10: 140 girls, 129 boys, one not reported; 59% White, 3% Black, 10% Asian, one Native American, 17% multiracial or another race, 11% unreported. We also conducted two studies with 360 American adults recruited from Amazon mechanical Turk. In all four studies we found that children and adults judged institutional categories as more socially constituted than artifactual categories (in all studies) but as less subjective (in three of four studies). Whereas younger and older children's beliefs about subjectivity were similar, younger and older children expressed different beliefs about social constitution. Young children judged none of the category domains as socially constituted; older children differentiated between the three domains. These results support the conceptual independence of subjectivity and social constitution and suggest that concepts of institutions and artifacts differ. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

"I know it's complicated": Children detect relevant information about object complexity.

Mechanistic complexity is an important property that affects how we interact with and learn from artifacts. Although highly complex artifacts have only recently become part of human material culture, they are ever-present in contemporary life. In previous research, children successfully detected complexity contrasts when given information about the functions of simple and complex objects. However, whether children spontaneously favor relevant information about an object's causal mechanisms and functions when trying to determine an object's complexity remains an open question. In Study 1, 7- to 9-year-olds and adults, but not 5- and 6-year-olds, rated information about relevant actions (e.g., the difficulty in fixing an object) as more helpful than information about irrelevant actions (e.g., the difficulty in spelling an object's name) for making determinations of mechanistic complexity. Only in Study 2, in which the relevance contrasts were extreme, did the youngest age group rate relevant actions as more helpful than irrelevant actions. In Study 3, in which participants rated the complexity of the actions themselves, participants performed differently than in the previous studies, suggesting that children in the prior studies did not misinterpret the study instructions as prompts to rate the actions' complexity. These results suggest that the ability to detect which object properties imply complexity emerges during the early school years. Younger children may be misled by features that are not truly diagnostic of mechanistic complexity, whereas older children more easily disregard such features in favor of relevant information.

Says who? Children consider informants' sources when deciding whom to believe.

To successfully navigate the world, we cannot simply accept everything we hear as true. We must think critically about others' testimony, believing only sources who are well-informed and trustworthy. This ability is especially crucial in early childhood, a time when we both learn the most, and have the least prior knowledge we can fall back upon to verify others' claims. While even young children evaluate testimony by considering whether agents' firsthand experiences license their claims, much of the time, our informants do not possess firsthand knowledge. When agents transmit information learned from others (rather than discovered firsthand), can children also evaluate their testimony's social basis? Across 3 experiments (N = 390), we manipulate the number of primary sources originating a claim, and the number of secondary sources repeating it. We find that by age 6, children understand that a claim is only as reliable as its original source, endorsing claims supported by more primary (rather than secondary) sources. While young preschoolers already understand the link between firsthand perceptual access and knowledge, these results suggest that a full understanding of testimony's social basis may be later-developing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Quantity perception: The forest and the trees.

Park (2021) has described "flawed stimulus design(s)" in our recent studies on area perception. Here, we briefly respond to those critiques. While the rigorous, computational approaches taken by Park (and others) certainly have value, we believe that our approach - one that focuses the perceptual reality of quantity rather than the physical reality - is essential. We emphasize again (as we have many times in our work) that the study of quantity perception benefits from both approaches. To further illustrate our point, we collected additional data and show that some of Park's arguments, while sensible in principle, further support our view in practice.

Thinking takes time: Children use agents' response times to infer the source, quality, and complexity of their knowledge.

Limits on mental speed entail speed-accuracy tradeoffs for problem-solving, but memory and perception are accurate on much faster timescales. While response times drive inference across the behavioral sciences, they may also help laypeople interpret each othejognrs' everyday behavior. We examined children's (ages 5 to 10) use of agents' response time to infer the source and quality of their knowledge. In each trial, children saw a pathfinding puzzle presented to an agent, who claimed to have solved it after either 3s or 20s. In Experiment 1 (n = 135), children used agents' response speed to distinguish between memory, perception, and novel inference. In Experiment 2 (n = 135), children predicted that fast responses would be inaccurate, but were less skeptical of slow agents. In Experiment 3 (n = 128), children inferred task complexity from agents' speed. Our findings suggest that the simple intuition that thinking takes time may scaffold everyday social cognition.

Understanding "Why:" How Implicit Questions Shape Explanation Preferences.

Adults and children 'promiscuously' endorse teleological answers to 'why' questions-a tendency linked to arguments that humans are intuitively theistic and naturally unscientific. But how do people arrive at an endorsement of a teleological answer? Here, we show that the endorsement of teleological answers need not imply unscientific reasoning (n = 880). A series of experiments show that (a) 'why' questions can be understood as a query for one of two distinct kinds of information and (b) these "implicit questions" can explain adults' answer preferences without appeal to unscientific worldviews. As a strong test of this view, we show that people endorse teleological answers that can answer relevant (implicit) questions about something's purpose, even when those answers are explicitly non-causal. Thus, we argue that endorsement of teleological answers does not necessarily equate to the endorsement of teleological 'explanations': Instead, explanation preferences may simply be an indication of people's pragmatic expectations about the questions that others ask. This view reframes how we should think about explanation preferences in general, while also offering practical insight into the pragmatics of question asking.

Do children estimate area using an "Additive-Area Heuristic"?

A large and growing body of work has documented robust illusions of area perception in adults. To date, however, there has been surprisingly little in-depth investigation into children's area perception, despite the importance of this topic to the study of quantity perception more broadly (and to the many studies that have been devoted to studying children's number perception). Here, in order to understand the interactions of number and area on quantity perception, we study both dimensions in tandem. This work is inspired by recent studies showing that human adults estimate area via an "Additive Area Heuristic," whereby the horizontal and vertical dimensions are summed rather than multiplied. First, we test whether children may rely on this same kind of heuristic. Indeed, "additive area" explains children's area judgments better than true, mathematical area. Second, we show that children's use of "additive area" biases number judgments. Finally, to isolate "additive area" from number, we test children's area perception in a task where number is held constant across all trials. We find something surprising: even when there is no overall effect of "additive area" or "mathematical area," individual children adopt and stick to specific strategies throughout the task. In other words, some children appear to rely on "additive area," while others appear to rely on true, mathematical area - a pattern of results that may be best explained by a misunderstanding about the concept of cumulative area. We discuss how these findings raise both theoretical and practical challenges of studying quantity perception in young children.

The potential for effective reasoning guides children's preference for small group discussion over crowdsourcing.

Communication between social learners can make a group collectively "wiser" than any individual, but conformist tendencies can also distort collective judgment. We asked whether intuitions about when communication is likely to improve or distort collective judgment could allow social learners to take advantage of the benefits of communication while minimizing the risks. In three experiments (n = 360), 7- to 10-year old children and adults decided whether to refer a question to a small group for discussion or "crowdsource" independent judgments from individual advisors. For problems affording the kind of 'demonstrative' reasoning that allows a group member to reliably correct errors made by even a majority, all ages preferred to consult the discussion group, even compared to a crowd ten times as large-consistent with past research suggesting that discussion groups regularly outperform even their best members for reasoning problems. In contrast, we observed a consistent developmental shift towards crowdsourcing independent judgments when reasoning by itself was insufficient to conclusively answer a question. Results suggest sophisticated intuitions about the nature of social influence and collective intelligence may guide our social learning strategies from early in development.

Win-win denial: The psychological underpinnings of zero-sum thinking.

A core proposition in economics is that voluntary exchanges benefit both parties. We show that people often deny the mutually beneficial nature of exchange, instead espousing the belief that one or both parties fail to benefit from the exchange. Across four studies (and 8 further studies in the online supplementary materials), participants read about simple exchanges of goods and services, judging whether each party to the transaction was better off or worse off afterward. These studies revealed that win-win denial is pervasive, with buyers consistently seen as less likely to benefit from transactions than sellers. Several potential psychological mechanisms underlying win-win denial are considered, with the most important influences being mercantilist theories of value (confusing wealth for money) and theory of mind limits (failing to observe that people do not arbitrarily enter exchanges). We argue that these results have widespread implications for politics and society. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Motive on the mind: Explanatory preferences at multiple stages of the legal-investigative process.

Much work has investigated explanatory preferences for things like animals and artifacts, but how do explanation preferences manifest in everyday life? Here, we focus on the criminal justice system as a case study. In this domain, outcomes critically depend on how actors in the system (e.g., lawyers, jurors) generate and interpret explanations. We investigate lay preferences for two difference classes of information: information that appeals to opportunistic aspects of a crime (i.e., how the culprit could have committed the crime) vs. motivational aspects of that crime (i.e., the purpose for committing the crime). In two studies, we demonstrate that people prefer 'motive' accounts of crimes (analogous to a teleology preference) at different stages of the investigative process. In an additional two studies we demonstrate that these preferences are context-sensitive: namely, we find that 'motive' information tends to be more incriminating and less exculpatory. We discuss these findings in light of a broad literature on the cognitive basis of explanatory preferences; specifically, we draw analogy to preferences for teleological vs. mechanistic explanations. We also discuss implications for the criminal justice system.

Evidence for multiple sources of inductive potential: Occupations and their relations to social institutions.

Several current theories have essences as primary drivers of inductive potential: e.g., people infer dogs share properties because they share essences. We investigated the possibility that people take occupational roles as having robust inductive potential because of a different source: their position in stable social institutions. In Studies 1-4, participants learned a novel property about a target, and then decided whether two new individuals had the property (one with the same occupation, one without). Participants used occupational roles to robustly generalize rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills. In Studies 5-6, we contrasted occupational roles (via label) with race/gender (via visual face cues). Participants reliably favored occupational roles over race/gender for generalizing rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills (they favored race/gender for inferring leisure behaviors and physiological properties). Occupational roles supported inferences to the same extent as animal categories (Studies 4 and 6). In Study 7, we examined why members of occupational roles share properties. Participants did not attribute the inductive potential of occupational roles to essences, they attributed it to social institutions. In combination, these seven studies demonstrate that any theory of inductive potential must pluralistically allow for both essences and social institutions to form the basis of inductive potential.

How We See Area and Why It Matters.

A large and growing literature examines how we see the visual quantities of number, area, and density. The literature rests on an untested assumption: that our perception of area is veridical. Here, we discuss a systematic distortion of perceived area and its implications for quantity perception more broadly.

A Ubiquitous Illusion of Volume: Are Impressions of 3D Volume Captured by an "Additive Heuristic"?

Several empirical approaches have attempted to explain perception of 2D and 3D size. While these approaches have documented interesting perceptual effects, they fail to offer a compelling, general explanation of everyday size perception. Here, we offer one. Building on prior work documenting an "Additive Area Heuristic" by which observers estimate perceived area by summing objects' dimensions, we show that this same principle-an "additive heuristic"-explains impressions of 3D volume. Observers consistently discriminate sets that vary in "additive volume," even when there is no true difference; they also fail to discriminate sets that truly differ (even by amounts as much as 30%) when they are equated in "additive volume." These results suggest a failure to properly integrate multiple spatial dimensions, and frequent reliance on a perceptual heuristic instead.

Using space to remember: Short-term spatial structure spontaneously improves working memory.

Spatial information plays an important role in how we remember. In general, there are two (non mutually exclusive) views regarding the role that space plays in memory. One view is that objects overlapping in space interfere with each other in memory. For example, objects presented in the same location (at different points in time) are more frequently confused with one another than objects that are not. Another view is that spatial information can 'bootstrap' other kinds of information. For example, remembering a phone number is easier one can see the arrangement of a keypad. Here, building on both perspectives, we test the hypothesis that task-irrelevant spatial structure (i.e., objects appearing in stable locations over repeated iterations) improves working memory. Across 7 experiments, we demonstrate that (1) irrelevant spatial structure improves memory for sequences of objects; (2) this effect does not depend on long-term spatial associations; (3) this effect is unique to space (as opposed to features like color); and (4) spatial structure can be teased apart from spatial interference, and the former drives memory improvement. We discuss how these findings relate to and challenge 'spatial interference' accounts as well as 'visuospatial bootstrapping'.

The Shape of Space: Evidence for Spontaneous but Flexible Use of Polar Coordinates in Visuospatial Representations.

What is the format of spatial representation? In mathematics, we often conceive of two primary ways of representing 2D space, Cartesian coordinates, which capture horizontal and vertical relations, and polar coordinates, which capture angle and distance relations. Do either of these two coordinate systems play a representational role in the human mind? Six experiments, using a simple visual-matching paradigm, show that (a) representational format is recoverable from the errors that observers make in simple spatial tasks, (b) human-made errors spontaneously favor a polar coordinate system of representation, and (c) observers are capable of using other coordinate systems when acting in highly structured spaces (e.g., grids). We discuss these findings in relation to classic work on dimension independence as well as work on spatial representation at other spatial scales.

The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development.

Young children often struggle to answer the question "what would have happened?" particularly in cases where the adult-like "correct" answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what to change and what to keep fixed when comparing counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, most developmental studies on counterfactual reasoning have relied on binary yes/no responses to counterfactual questions about complex narratives and so have only been able to document when these failures occur but not why and how. Here, we investigate counterfactual reasoning in a domain in which specific counterfactual possibilities are very concrete: simple collision interactions. In Experiment 1, we show that 5- to 10-year-old children (recruited from schools and museums in Connecticut) succeed in making predictions but struggle to answer binary counterfactual questions. In Experiment 2, we use a multiple-choice method to allow children to select a specific counterfactual possibility. We find evidence that 4- to 6-year-old children (recruited online from across the United States) do conduct counterfactual simulations, but the counterfactual possibilities younger children consider differ from adult-like reasoning in systematic ways. Experiment 3 provides further evidence that young children engage in simulation rather than using a simpler visual matching strategy. Together, these experiments show that the developmental changes in counterfactual reasoning are not simply a matter of whether children engage in counterfactual simulation but also how they do so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

An Illusion of Self-Sufficiency for Learning About Artifacts in Scaffolded Learners, But Not Observers.

Two studies ask whether scaffolded children (n = 243, 5-6 years and 9-10 years) recognize that assistance is needed to learn to use complex artifacts. In Study 1, children were asked to learn to use a toy pantograph. While children recognized the need for assistance for indirect knowledge, 70% of scaffolded children claimed that they would have learned to use the artifact without assistance, even though 0% of children actually succeeded without assistance. In Study 2, this illusion of self-sufficiency was significantly attenuated when observing another learner being scaffolded. Learners may fail to appreciate artifacts' opacity because self-directed exploration can be partially informative, such that learning to use artifacts is typically scaffolded instead of taught explicitly.